California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Soto, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 732, 4 Cal.5th 968, 415 P.3d 789 (Cal. 2018):
" Mendoza does not support defendant's position. An aider and abettor must intend not only the act of encouraging and facilitating, but also the additional criminal act the perpetrator commits. ( People v. Mendoza , supra , 18 Cal.4th at p. 1129, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735.) Because the knowledge requirement was intimately entwined with intent, we concluded that it "is closely akin to Hood 's definition of specific intent." ( Id . at p. 1131, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735.) On the other hand, the definition of arson does not refer to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence. Moreover, our holding in Mendoza is very narrow, limited to admission of evidence of intoxication solely on the question of aider and abettor liability. (
[415 P.3d 797]
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