What is the effect of voluntary intoxication on a jury's decision to convict a defendant of three counts of first degree murder?

Although we find the court's voluntary intoxication instruction constituted error, it does not require reversal. The instruction allowed the jury to consider evidence of defendant's voluntary intoxication with regard to premeditation and deliberation. The jury was instructed that "[t]he defendant acted deliberately if he carefully weighed the considerations for and against his choice and knowing the consequences, decided to kill." It was also told that "[a] decision to kill made rashly, impulsively or without careful consideration is not deliberate and premeditated." (Italics added.) As the trial court instructed, to find that defendant killed in the heat of passion, the jury had to conclude that "the defendant acted rashly and under the influence of intense emotion that obscured his reasoning or judgment." (See People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) By convicting defendant of three counts of first degree murder in light of the intoxication evidence, the jury impliedly resolved that defendant did not act rashly but rather he deliberated and premeditated. Thus, the jury necessarily decided that defendant did not have the state of mind required for killing in the heat of passion.