What is the effect of Section 220.25(1) of the Criminal Code of the United States on a presumption of innocence in sexual assault cases?

The effect of 220.25(1) is therefore the same as the presumption approved in United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 70, 85 S.Ct. 754, 13 L.Ed.2d 658 (1965), for it "simply means that a jury may, if it sees fit, convict upon such evidence, as it shall be deemed in law sufficient to authorize a conviction, but does not require such a result." (emphasis deleted) Since the decision whether to accept or reject the conclusions indicated by the presumption is thus entirely in the hands of the jury, the judge's only role is to make certain that the jury is not afforded an opportunity to reach a verdict of guilty on an irrational basis. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943). For a presumption to meet this standard, it must "at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend." Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969). ⁷ In making this judicial assessment, we must "weigh heavily" the legislative determination favoring the particular presumption. Id.