What is the current state of the law on warrantless removal?

¹² Cases applying Rogers and Mabe after the events giving rise to this case, while not directly applicable to the clearly established law inquiry, confirm our understanding of Rogers and Mabe . We have continued to be careful to emphasize the need for a clear showing of both imminence and specific, serious physical danger to the child. For example, in Burke v. Cty. of Alameda , 586 F.3d 725, 73132 (9th Cir. 2009), we held that, under circumstances of that case, in which a stepfather's sexual abuse and physical violence could recur at any time according to the child's report of abuse, there was reasonable cause to believe that an imminent risk of serious bodily injury justified a the child's warrantless removal. We reiterated that "[p]olice officers must have specific, articulable evidence ... that a child is in imminent danger of abuse." Id. at 731 (internal quotation marks omitted).

¹³ None of the photographs here at issue meets that description.

¹ I agree with the Majority that Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago , U.S. , 138 S.Ct. 13, 199 L.Ed.2d 249 (2017), clearly articulated the difference between jurisdictional rules (those grounded in the United States Code) and "mandatory claim-processing rules" which "must be enforced," but, nevertheless, may also be waived or forfeited, and that the rule primarily at question in this case (Rule 4(a)(4) and the effect of the tolling motions listed therein) is a "mandatory claim-processing rule" and not a jurisdictional rule. Id. at 17.