What is the current state of the law on the Miranda rights of a suspect in a criminal case?

silent, to the presence of an attorney, and, if indigent, to appointed counsel.' [Citation.] If at any point in the interview the suspect invokes the right to remain silent or the right to counsel, 'the interrogation must cease.' [Citations.]" (People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1104-1105.)

"The prohibition against further questioning in these circumstances is not a constitutional requirement, but rather a prophylactic rule '"designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights."' [Citation.]" (People v. Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 376.)

A suspect's invocation of the right to silence must be "unambiguous and unequivocal." (People v. Nelson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 377.) "'[I]f an ambiguous act, omission, or statement could require police to end the interrogation, police would be required to make difficult decisions about an accused's unclear intent and face the consequence of suppression "if they guess wrong."' [Citation.] In such circumstances, suppression of a voluntary confession 'would place a significant burden on society's interest in prosecuting criminal activity.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 378.)

"A defendant . . . 'may indicate an unwillingness to discuss certain subjects without manifesting a desire to terminate "an interrogation already in progress."' [Citation.]" (People v. Thomas (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 987, 1005.) "A defendant has not unambiguously and unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent when his statements . . . amount only to a refusal to discuss a particular subject. [Citations.]" (Id. at pp. 1005-1006.)

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