What is the current state of the law on the double jeopardy clause in juvenile law?

In Swisher v. Brady (1978) 438 U.S. 204 [98 S.Ct. 2699, 57 L.Ed.2d 705], the United States Supreme Court considered a juvenile law procedure that permitted a case to be heard first by a master and then by a judge of the juvenile court. The high court held that the prescribed procedure did not violate the double jeopardy clause, because "an accused juvenile is subjected to a single proceeding which begins with a master's hearing and culminates with an adjudication by a judge." (Id. at p. 215, 98 S.Ct. at p. 2706.) This holding was based upon the high court's conclusion that the challenged procedure "does not impinge on the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause," because it "does not provide the prosecution that forbidden 'second crack' " at supplying evidence it failed to produce in an earlier hearing, it did not enhance the risk that an innocent person would be convicted "by taking the question of guilt to a series of persons or groups empowered to make binding determinations," and it did not unfairly subject "the defendant to the embarrassment, expense, and ordeal of a second trial...." (Id. at pp. 215-216, 98 S.Ct. at pp. 2706-2707.)