What is the current state of the law on the doctrine of "presumption of innocence"?

Nevertheless, due process does not mandate the "use of the particular phrase 'presumption of innocence'--or any other form of words...." (Taylor v. Kentucky, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 485, 98 S.Ct. at p. 1935; see id., at p. 488, fn. 16, 98 S.Ct. at p. 1936, fn. 16.) Rather, this traditional formulation "simply represents one means of protecting the accused's constitutional right to be judged solely on the basis of proof adduced at trial." (Id., at p. 486, 98 S.Ct. at p. 1935, fn. omitted.) Accordingly, we decline defendant's implicit invitation to confine instruction on the presumption of innocence to any rigid or narrowly precise terms. (See id., at p. 488, fn. 16, 98 S.Ct. at p. 1936, fn. 16.) As long as the court's charge to the jury conveys the substance of the principle, it will satisfy due process.

The record here meets the standard of Taylor v. Kentucky, supra, 436 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 1930; the jury was fully apprised of its responsibility to adjudicate guilt on the evidence presented in court rather than on the basis of extraneous considerations. At the outset of the proceedings, the court admonished prospective jurors the information did not constitute evidence of guilt and they should not draw any adverse inference from the fact of defendant's arrest; nor should they be influenced by sympathy, passion, prejudice, or public feeling. The introductory guilt phase instructions directed the jury to "determine the facts of the case from the evidence received in the trial and not from any [4 Cal.4th 73] other source." (CALJIC No. 1.00.) The jury also received the full panoply of instructions regarding the presumption of innocence, the measure of reasonable doubt, and the prosecutor's burden of proof. ²⁰ (CALJIC Nos. 2.90 & 2.91; see also 1096, 1096a.) Accordingly, we reject the contention that the omitted instruction impinged the constitutional guaranty of due process. ²¹