What is the current state of the law on the application of federal constitutional standards in the context of courtroom security in a criminal case?

Although the trial court stated that it would intervene in security matters to protect the due process rights of defendants, it failed to do so. In contrast, consider the application of federal constitutional standards described in the case of Spain v. Rushen (9th Cir.1989) 883 F.2d 712. Even though the history of escape and violence shown by defendant there justified a measure of additional courtroom security (id., at pp. 719-720), the court held that trial courts should pursue less restrictive alternatives before restraints were imposed. (Id., at p. 721.) The trial court should then weigh the benefits and burdens of shackling against other possible alternatives, such as excluding the defendant from the trial. (Id., at pp. 721, 726.) The court said: "Due process requires that shackles be imposed only as a last resort. In determining whether shackling is a last resort, a trial judge must consider the benefits and burdens associated with imposing physical restraints in the particular case. If the alternatives are less onerous yet no less beneficial, due process [14 Cal.App.4th 1827] demands that the trial judge opt for one of the alternatives." (Id., at p. 728.) Here there was no evidence that the trial court considered physical restraints to be a last resort, rather than a first resort. (People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 945, 258 Cal.Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 1330.)

Contrast also the measures taken in the recent case of People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 94-97, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23. The trial court there "conducted not one but two special hearings to determine the need for restraints, carefully considered the evidence of defendant's prior violence and escape attempt as well as more recent threats against the court and bailiffs, and imposed the least visible or obtrusive restraints available outside the presence of the jury." (Id., at pp. 96-97, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23.)

e. Standard of Review for Prejudice.