California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from Arato v. Avedon, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 131, 5 Cal.4th 1172, 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993):
Since Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d 229, 104 Cal.Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1, was decided, we have revisited the doctrine of informed consent. In Truman v. Thomas (1980) 27 Cal.3d 285, 165 Cal.Rptr. 308, 611 P.2d 902, we held that the physician's duty of due care embraced disclosure of the material risks resulting from the patient's refusal to consent to a recommended treatment--in that case, a routine annual pap smear. In concluding that the trial court had erred reversibly in refusing to instruct the jury on the physician's duty of disclosure, we said that the doctrine of informed consent recognized in Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d 229, 104 Cal.Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1, was imposed "so that patients might meaningfully exercise their right to make decisions about their own bodies." (Truman v. Thomas, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 292, 165 Cal.Rptr. 308, 611 P.2d 902.)
[5 Cal.4th 1184] Our opinion also stressed the paramount role of the trier of fact in informed consent cases. We recognized, for example, that questions such as whether the danger posed by a failure to disclose a particular risk is remote, whether the risk was or was not commonly known, and whether circumstances unique to a given case supported a duty of disclosure were matters for the jury to decide. We accordingly declined to hold that as a matter of law the physician owed no duty to make a given disclosure to the patient. That question, we concluded, was one for the jury to decide. (Truman v. Thomas, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 293-294, 165 Cal.Rptr. 308, 611 P.2d 902.)
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