What is the burden of proving intent against a defendant for false statements under the Insurance Code and Penal Code?

Defendant maintains that the evidence was insufficient to prove he had the requisite intent to be convicted of violating either Insurance Code section 1871.4, subdivision (a)(1), or Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(3). Our review of that claim is governed by the deferential substantial evidence standard of review. Our task is to decide whether, on the evidence presented, a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, 518.) In applying this test we presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. (People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 578.) We review the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence, i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.)

Insurance Code section 1871.4, subdivision (a)(1), provides that it is unlawful to "[m]ake or cause to be made a knowingly false or fraudulent material statement or material representation for the purpose of obtaining or denying any compensation, as defined in Section 3207 of the Labor Code." The prosecution's burden is to prove that the defendant knowingly made a false, material statement, for the purpose of obtaining workers' compensation benefits. (People v. Webb (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 688, 693.) A defendant acts with the required intent when he presents information he knows to be false with the intent that the insurance company rely upon it to settle his claim. (People v. Booth (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1254, fn. 3; People v. Dieguez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 279.)