What is the burden of proof in determining eligibility for resentencing under Proposition 47?

In support of his suggestion that the prosecution should bear the burden of proof as to the value of the vehicle in determining eligibility for resentencing under Proposition 47, Baird cites cases addressing the resentencing procedure under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36). Under section 1170.126, the resentencing provision of Proposition 36, a prisoner serving a third strike sentence (an indeterminate life term) for a felony that is not statutorily defined as serious and/or violent may petition to be resentenced and to receive a second strike sentence of twice the term otherwise authorized for the current felony. ( 1170.126, subds. (b), (e)(1), (f); see 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1); People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 679-680.) An inmate is disqualified from resentencing if exceptions based on his or her current offense or prior offenses are present. ( 1170.126, subd. (e)(2)-(3); see 667, subd. (e)(2)(C), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C); People v. Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 681-682.)

Appellate courts have concluded that, when a trial court must determine whether an inmate is ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 36 because an exception based on his or her current or former offenses applies, the court must make that determination based on the record of conviction. (People v. Bradford (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1327, 1332, 1337-1340 [court was limited to record of conviction in determining whether, during the commission of his "current" offense, the defendant "used a firearm, was armed with a firearm or deadly weapon, or intended to cause great bodily injury to another person," and thus was ineligible for resentencing pursuant to 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii), and 1170.126, subd. (e)(2)].)⁵ As to the

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