What is an "open plea" in a criminal case?

An open plea, in contrast to a plea bargain, is "one under which the defendant is not offered any promises. [Citation.] In other words, the defendant 'plead[s] unconditionally, admitting all charges and exposing himself to the maximum possible sentence if the court later chose to

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impose it.' " (People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 381, fn. 4.)

In connection with an open plea, " 'the court may indicate "what sentence [it] will impose if a given set of facts is confirmed, irrespective of whether guilt is adjudicated at trial or admitted by plea." ' " (People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, 570.) An indicated sentence, however, is not a promise from the court. (Id. at p. 575.) By indicating a sentence, "the court has merely disclosed to the parties at an early stageand to the extent possiblewhat the court views, on the record then available, as the appropriate sentence so that each party may make an informed decision." (Ibid.) Accordingly, if the factual predicate underlying an indicated sentence is disproved at trial, the court may withdraw that indicated sentence. (Id. at p. 576.) Furthermore, the court retains broad discretion to modify an indicated sentence even if its factual predicate is not disproved. (Id. at pp. 576-577.) In particular, "[t]he development of new information at sentencing may persuade the trial court that the sentence previously indicated is no longer appropriate for this defendant or these offenses. Or, after considering the available information more carefully, the trial court may likewise conclude that the indicated sentence is not appropriate." (Id. at p. 576.) Therefore, a court may sentence a defendant differently than an indicated sentence based on additional new information or a reexamination of the relevant circumstances. (Ibid.)

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In People v. Clancey, supra, 56 Cal.4th 562, our highest court stated: "[A]n indicated sentence is not a promise that a particular sentence will ultimately be imposed at sentencing. Nor does it divest a trial court of its ability to exercise its discretion at the sentencing hearing, whether based on the evidence and argument presented by the parties or on a more careful and refined judgment as to the appropriate sentence . . . . [T]he utility of the indicated-sentence procedure . . . depends to a great extent on whether the record then before the court contains the information about the defendant and the defendant's offenses that is relevant to sentencing." (Id. at p. 576, first and third italics added.) Therefore, a trial court retains its "full discretion" at sentencing to select a fair and just punishment despite any previous indicated sentence. (Ibid.)