What are the consequences of a defendant not being advised of their right to confrontation, confrontation and right to remain silent?

Those cases in which a defendant was not expressly advised of his or her trial rights (right to trial, confrontation, and right to remain silent) generally fall into two categories: cases where the record is completely silent as to an advisement of rights; and those where the Boykin-Tahl advisements are incomplete. (See People v. Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 361-364.) The present case falls into the latter category. Defendant was advised of his right to a court trialhe had already waived his right to a jury trial on the state prison prior allegationsbut he was not advised of the remaining Boykin-Tahl rights.

When an admission has been entered without an express waiver of one of the defendant's trial rights (confrontation or silence), "[t]he pertinent inquiry" is "whether 'the record affirmatively shows that [the admission] is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances ' [citation] applying 'the test used to determine the validity of guilty pleas under the federal Constitution.' [Citation.]" (People v. Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 360.) Use of the totality of the circumstances test means California has rejected the rule that "'express admonitions and waivers'" are the sine qua non of a knowing and intelligent waiver. (Id. at p. 361, quoting People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1178.)

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In People v. Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th 353, the defendant was charged with selling cocaine. The information alleged he had suffered a prior conviction for possessing a controlled substance. (Id. at p. 356.) Trial on the prior conviction allegation was bifurcated from the trial on the substantive offense. (Id. at p. 357.) Immediately after the jury returned a guilty verdict, the defendant admitted the truth of the prior conviction allegation upon being advised by the court of his right to a court trial on the prior conviction allegation. The defendant had already waived his right to a jury trial. (Id. at pp. 357-358.) On appeal, the defendant contended his admission was not voluntary and intelligent because he was only advised of his right to a court trial; he was not advised an admission would require him to forego his right to confrontation and his right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination. (Id. at pp. 356, 359.)