Is there any basis to support a finding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to take into account the impact of a motor vehicle accident on a young motorcyclist with chronic myofascial pain and fibromyalgia?

Finally, I am not persuaded that the trial judge erred in principle. The cross-appellants submit that by failing to take into account independent intervening events which arose after the accident, he placed the appellant in a better position than the one she would have found herself in the absence of negligence on their part, contrary to Athey v. Leonati, 1996 CanLII 183 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458. The trial judge found that while such other stresses or events may have contributed to the development of chronic myofascial pain and the fibromyalgia, but for the accident these conditions would not have arisen. I see no basis to interfere with this conclusion. Standard of Review

A court of appeal is not to alter a damage award made at trial unless it concludes that there was no evidence upon which the trial judge could have reached the conclusion he did, or he proceeded upon a mistaken or wrong principle, or where the result at trial was wholly erroneous: Woelk v. Halvorson (1980), 1980 CanLII 17 (SCC), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.) at p. 388. Non-Pecuniary Loss