What is the standard of review for a trial judge’s findings of fact?

In Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, Iacobucci and Major JJ., established that the standard of review for a trial judge’s findings of fact is palpable and overriding error. At paras. 23-24 they commented on the deference which should be given to the trial judge’s findings of fact, and in particular her assessment of the credibility of the witnesses: We reiterate that it is not the role of appellate courts to second-guess the weight to be assigned to the various items of evidence. If there is no palpable and overriding error with respect to the underlying facts that the trial judge relies on to draw the inference, then it is only where the inference-drawing process itself is palpably in error that an appellate court can interfere with the factual conclusion. The appellate court is not free to interfere with a factual conclusion that it disagrees with where such disagreement stems from a difference of opinion over the weight to be assigned to the underlying facts.... [A]lthough the same high standard of deference applies to the entire range of factual determinations made by the trial judge, where a factual finding is grounded in an assessment of credibility of a witness, the overwhelming advantage of the trial judge in this area must be acknowledged. [Emphasis in original]