What is the current state of the law on the issue of "reasonableness" under a percentage fee agreement?

I would note with reference to Deans v. Armstrong that McKenzie J. appears to have dealt with the issue of "reasonableness" as of the time the fee agreement was entered into. In my view, with respect, the concept of "reasonableness" is to be considered not only at the time the contract was entered into but over the whole term of the percentage fee agreement. While not pertinent to the case on appeal, if, during the course of the litigation, the risk of non-payment or the amount of work required becomes much less than originally anticipated, the court may make an appropriate adjustment to the percentage fee. In those cases, quite apart from court intervention, there is, in my opinion, an implicit duty on the solicitor to make an appropriate downward adjustment in the percentage fee.

Another substantial difference between the two cases is that in Deans v. Armstrong the plaintiff was not given the choice of entering into a contingency fee agreement or of making payment for services rendered on a fee-for-service basis. I point out, moreover, that in the case on appeal, unlike Deans v. Armstrong, the plaintiff could have terminated the fee agreement prior to discovery and paid for services rendered up to the point of termination on a fee-for-service basis.