Does a disciplinary board have a duty to follow the procedure of a judicial type of procedure?

See also the judgment of Dickson J. in Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Bd., supra, at p. 622 as follows: In the case at bar, the disciplinary board was not under either an express or implied duty to follow a judicial type of procedure, but the board was obliged to find facts affecting a subject and to exercise a form of discretion in pronouncing judgment and penalty. Moreover, the board's decision had the effect of depriving an individual of his liberty by committing him to a "prison within a prison". In these circumstances, elementary justice requires some procedural protection. The rule of law must run within penitentiary walls.

With respect to this issue, I am of the opinion that the approach taken by Warren C.J.U.S. in Peyton v. Rowe (1968), 391 U.S. 54, 20 L. Ed. (2d) 426, 88 S. Ct. 1549, is apt. In that case he said [per U.S. headnote]: The writ of habeas corpus is not a static, narrow formalistic remedy and its scope has continually developed in order that it constantly protect individuals against the erosion of the right to be free from wrongful restraints on their liberty.