What is the legal test for complicity in an international crime?

In Penate v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1993 CanLII 3017 (FCA), [1994] 2 F. C. 79 (F.C.T.D.) Justice Reed, at paragraph 6, framed the requirement for complicity in the following terms: As I understand the jurisprudence, it is that a person who is a member of the persecuting group and who has knowledge that activities are being committed by the group and who neither takes steps to prevent them occurring (if he has the power to do so) nor disengages himself from the group at the earliest opportunity (consistent with safety for himself) but who lends his active support to the group will be considered to be an accomplice. A shared common purpose will be considered to exist. I note that the situation envisaged by this jurisprudence is not one in which isolated incidents of international offences have occurred but where the commission of such offences is a continuous and regular part of the operation.