I do not think however that it is necessary to pass upon the nature of the misrepresentation further than to affirm that the plaintiff was actually misled by it for I have come to the conclusion that she has a good cause of action because the defendant broke his promise to marry her. Looking at the evidence analytically it seems to me that the injurious condition for which the plaintiff now seeks relief is fundamentally attributable to such breach, or, to put it in another way, it is due to the fact that because of his fraud she is not his wife. It may be urged of course that he never refused to marry her. It is enough however if there be some equivalent of a refusal: Grant v. Cornock (1889) 16 O.A.R. 532, at 541.
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