The statutory language is that of full discretion. This ministerial phase in the extradition process arises only once there has been an extradition hearing resulting in a judicial decision to commit the fugitive for extradition. The Minister's task, engaging as it does both the circumstances of the individual and Canada's international obligations, has been described as primarily political, not judicial. In Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice) (1992), 1992 CanLII 51 (SCC), 77 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (S.C.C.) at pp. 86-87, Cory J. put it this way: It is the Minister who must consider the good faith and honour of this country in its relations with other states. It is the Minister who has the expert knowledge of the political ramifications of an extradition decision. . . . . . ... the decision to issue a warrant of surrender involves completely different considerations from those reached by a court in an extradition hearing. The extradition hearing is clearly judicial in its nature while the actions of the Minister of Justice in considering whether to issue a warrant of surrender are primarily political in nature. ... At the judicial phase the fugitive possesses the full panoply of procedural protection available in a court of law. At the ministerial phase, there is no longer a lis in existence. The fugitive has by then been judicially committed for extradition. The Act simply grants to the Minister a discretion as to whether to execute the judicially approved extradition by issuing a warrant of surrender.
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