The trial judge had to interpret the contract and, after examining the authorities, his principal finding was that: The plaintiffs attempt to draw an analogy between the promises in Green v. Ward and Ahone v. Holloway, and the requirement of the defendant to use due diligence and good faith in securing approval of the development plan, must fail. The comparison simply cannot be made: In those cases the consideration was fixed and certain, only its value must be ascertained; while in the case at bar the obligation to pursue the application is not part of the payment for the land, it is merely one element in a process which may or may not lead to a higher price ... His other principal finding was that the contingent right of the vendor to the higher price did not materialize by September 30th, the date set out in the contract and could not survive the passing of that date. He concluded his judgment with the following paragraph: The answer to all of the plaintiff's argument supporting the lis pendens can be expressed simply: The alleged failure of the defendant to pursue the rezoning application diligently did not trigger the additional payment; only city approval could have done that. The defendant does not owe the plaintiff part of the price of land; rather, it is accountable to the plaintiff in damages for any breach of the agreement which prevented the realization of a higher price. The application to set aside the lis pendens is granted with costs to the defendant.
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