Further, the parties are agreed, in accordance with the analysis of Lederer J. in Fox Estate v. Narine,[5] that s. 16 (1.3) encompasses proceedings against persons other than those who actually perpetrate sexual assaults. Lederer J. noted that s. 16 (1.3) references proceedings involving claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty or for vicarious liability. He reasoned that this must necessarily include proceedings involving third parties: Neither party disputed the idea that this sub-clause was pointed at parties other than the perpetrator. A sexual assault is a criminal act. It cannot reasonably be proposed that before a person who carries out such an act can be civilly liable, he or she must have been negligent, in a fiduciary relationship with the victim, or owed the victim a duty. A perpetrator is directly involved and so cannot be vicariously liable for his or her own acts. It is when a third party stands in such a relationship to the victim that s. 16 (1)(h) is extended such that there is no limitation period that applies.
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