What is the test for determining unconscionability?

In Cain, Coté J.A. observed that the tests for determining unconscionability “are not always stated the same way” (paragraph 31). In saying this, he was recognizing that this area of the law has seen, in its development, a considerable degree of fluidity in the way the underlying concept has been formulated and applied in concrete situations. As noted by Sopinka J. in obiter in Norberg v. Wynrib , 1992 CanLII 65 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226 at 309, “the doctrine of unconscionability and the related principle of inequality of bargaining power are evolving and, as yet, not completely settled areas of the law of contract.” This is no doubt due in part to the tension that necessarily exists at the intersection of the operation of the doctrine with traditional notions of freedom and sanctity of contract, as exemplified in such notions as caveat emptor and the refusal of the court to inquire into the adequacy of consideration. The scope of the doctrine is also affected by having to make conceptual distinctions from other related equitable remedies based on claims of duress, undue influence, mistake and misrepresentation, among others.