What is the test for reasonable doubt in a sexual assault case?

The same applies to the judge having said that reasonable doubt is an honest, fair and real doubt, not an imaginary or frivolous one. In Lifchus, Cory J. said in para. 26: ... qualifications of the word ‘doubt’, other than by way of the adjective ‘reasonable’, should be avoided. For instance, instructing the jury that a ‘reasonable doubt’ is a ‘haunting’ doubt, a ‘substantial’ doubt or a ‘serious’ doubt, may have the effect of misleading the jury [Boucher v. The Queen, [1955], 111 C.C.C. 263]. What may be considered to be ‘haunting’, ‘substantial’ or ‘serious’ is bound to vary with the background and perceptions of each individual juror. As a result of the use of these words jurors will be likely to understand that they should apply a standard of proof that could be higher or lower than that required. In this case, the trial judge did not resort to colourful and potentially misleading language such as “haunting”. The language which he used falls within that which was approved in R. v. Lord, 1995 CanLII 127 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 747 and many other cases. It is not language which, as Cory J. said in the last sentence of para. 26, "would lead a juror to set an unacceptably high standard of certainty". The issue which must be decided when attacks of this kind are made on the adequacy of the charge is that stated in para. 41 of Lifchus, i.e., whether the charge as a whole gives rise to any likelihood that the jury misapprehended the standard of proof. There is no basis for such a conclusion in this case.