5 Given that the general rule prohibiting post-discharge jurisdiction serves to protect the interests of justice, it is axiomatic that an exception to that rule must serve the interests of justice in a way that adherence to the rule could not. Where it is carefully established that an error was made in recording the jury’s true verdict, the interests of justice will rarely be served by prohibiting the trial judge from altering the verdict as entered. Such a rigid adherence to procedural niceties, in my view, would undermine, rather than strengthen, the public’s confidence in our jury system by impeding the ascertainment of truth and justice. As the court in State v. Williquette, 526 N.W.2d 144 (Wis. 1995), concluded, at p. 151: It is not difficult, however, to imagine a scenario where an incorrect verdict transcription could result in a serious injustice. The public policy considerations of promoting a jury’s freedom of deliberation, the stability and finality of judgments and protecting jurors against annoyance and embarrassment are indeed noble and must be taken into account; however, these considerations may not completely trump the ascertainment of the “truth” as actually found by the jury. In the instance of an erroneously entered guilty verdict, it would be a serious injustice to allow an innocent person to remain in prison simply because members of the jury had separated or mingled with the public. There is no guarantee that the Attorney General would forego the holding of a new trial, given the limited inquiry concerning the verdict, and no certainty that a new trial would produce the same result. Even if bail were granted, the innocent person’s burden would be great. I believe that it is also society’s interest that those found guilty do not go free.
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