Is there any case law or case law that supports a finding that a statement by a Canadian migration integrity officer in Port-au-Prince (the MIO) in Haiti does not constitute torture?

This case raises the following four issues, on which counsel for the parties were heard at a full and complete hearing on December 16, 2009: (1) Did the officer err by assigning more weight to the statement by the Canadian migration integrity officer in Port-au-Prince (the MIO) than to the other documents submitted in evidence? (2) Did the officer err by disregarding the finding in Lavira v. Attorney General of the United States, 478 F.3d 158 (3rd Cir. 2007), that conditions of detention in Haiti could constitute torture? (3) Did the officer give sufficient justification for her conclusion that the applicant’s life would not be endangered by his conditions of detention? (4) Did the officer err by concluding that the discrimination the applicant would suffer in Haiti did not constitute cruel and unusual treatment?

With the exception of the third issue, they relate to the officer’s assessment of the evidence and findings of fact. The applicable standard of review is therefore reasonableness (see Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at paragraph 53). The issue of the sufficiency of the officer’s reasons involves procedural fairness, and so the applicable standard of review, in theory, is correctness. However, because there is no one form of reasons that is acceptable, and the function of reasons is primarily to ensure that the administrative decision is justified, transparent and intelligible, the standard for the sufficiency of the reasons is in fact more similar to reasonableness than to correctness. * * * * * * * * (1) Did the officer err by assigning more weight to the statement by the Canadian migratory integrity officer in Port-au-Prince (the MIO) than to the other documents submitted in evidence?