More recently, in R v. Tapaquon, 1993 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 535 at 559, L'Heureux-Dubé J. wrote in her dissent: First, I would emphasize that a preliminary inquiry is not a trial, and that the function of a justice at a preliminary inquiry is, as Cory J. stated in R. v. Barbeau, 1992 CanLII 76 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 845, at p. 853, "to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to commit the accused to trial.” The inquiry provides the accused with an opportunity to avoid the indignity of being placed on trial where there is simply insufficient evidence to justify the holding of a trial at all. The justice presiding at such an inquiry has the task of determining whether or not the accused should stand trial. A decision that the accused should be discharged is not appealable, and can be challenged only by way of certiorari. At the same time, a discharge is not a finding of "not guilty", and cannot form the basis of a plea of autrefois acquit. (Emphasis in original)
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