In what circumstances will there be conviction for evasion under s. 239(1) (d) of the Income Tax Evasion Act?

It follows from what I have said to this point that I am not prepared to go so far as to say that only in those cases where there is an artifice or a scheme can there be a conviction for evasion under this subsection. The presence of an artifice or scheme would tend to make it easier to draw the necessary inference of intent to evade payment of taxes, but in my respectful view it cannot be said that the existence of an artifice or scheme is a necessary element of the offence created by this subsection. Where the necessary intent is present, then the “manner” in which the intent is carried out is not important. The plain words of the subsection specify it may be done “in any manner”. That the Act does not contemplate an artifice or scheme to be the only manner in which an “evasion” may be accomplished is further evidenced by s. 163(1) which clearly enacts that an attempted evasion under that subsection can take place by simply “failing to file a return of income”. To the extent that Regina v. Baker, supra, holds that an artifice or scheme is a necessary element of an offence under s. 239(1) (d) of the Act, I find, with respect, that it does not correctly state the law.