Can a s.15 (1) claim be based on an "analogous ground"?

36 This definition of discrimination was linked to the specific grounds enumerated in s. 15, but these were said not to be exclusive. A s. 15 (1) claim can also be based on an “analogous” ground. While he did not attempt to define “analogous ground,” McIntyre J. described the concept as deriving its meaning from the specific grounds listed in s. 15 (at 175): The enumerated grounds in s. 15 (1) are not exclusive and the limits, if any on grounds for discrimination which may be established in future cases await definition. The enumerated grounds do, however, reflect the most common and probably the most socially destructive and historically practiced bases of discrimination and must, in the words of s. 15(1), receive particular attention. Both the enumerated grounds themselves and other possible grounds of discrimination recognized under S.15(1) must be interpreted in a broad and generous manner, reflecting the fact that they are constitutional provisions not easily repealed or amended but intended to provide a “continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power” and, at the same time, for “the unremitting protection” of equality rights: see Hunter v. Southam Inc., 1984 CanLII 33 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at p. 155