Is the delay caused by an appeal from a judicial stay subject to Charter scrutiny?

In concluding that the delay occasioned by an appeal is not subject to s. 11(b) Charter scrutiny, Sopinka J. stated: 69 The conclusion I have reached applies to appeals from acquittals and convictions. Furthermore, I see no valid reason to distinguish between an acquittal on the merits and a judicial stay. In light of the interest protected under s. 11(b), the differences between an acquittal and a judicial stay are purely technical. In both cases the accused can plead autrefois acquit and no proceedings may be brought in respect of the same charge unless the acquittal or stay is set aside on appeal. No restraints can be placed on the liberty of the former accused pending appeal. There is no basis on which to assume that the theoretical existence of a charge that has been stayed carries any greater stigma or causes greater anxiety to the respondent in an appeal from a judicial stay than an appeal from acquittal. Certainly there is no evidence on this point. I doubt that the public understands the difference. An unpopular acquittal generates as much public indignation as a stay. The degree of anxiety is dictated more by the strength of the grounds of appeal than by the form of the verdict. These observations were neatly summed up by Estey J. in Amato v. The Queen, 1982 CanLII 31 (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 418, at p. 457: While the charge may be said to hang over the head of the accused, this is a wholly theoretical observation because there is no forum for its further processing.