Can confidential information be considered property in the context of s.283(1)(d) of the Criminal Code?

In the Court of Appeal. Houlden, J.A. held that the definition of property in s.2 of the Criminal Code (supra) includes a thing which is property for the purposes of the civil law. Relying on dicta in the Exchange Telegraph cases, in some American cases, and in Boardman et al v. Phipps (H.L.) 1967 A.C. 46, he concluded that confidential information is capable of being “property” in civil law and therefore capable of being the subject matter of theft. Recognizing that the taking or conversion to constitute theft had to be accompanied by one of the intents specified in s.283(1)(d), he found that the taking or conversion of the information would destroy its confidentiality, and hence could not be “returned” in the condition it was in at the time it was taken or converted, although he had in the earlier part of the same sentence held that the owner of the information would not have been deprived of possession of the information.