What is the threshold for finding malice in a defamation case?

The threshold for proof of malice is high. For example, Esson J.A. in Pressler v. Lethbridge 86 B.C.L.R. (3d) 257, 2000 BCCA 639 observed at para. 111 that the desire of a media outlet to produce a sensational story does not constitute an improper purpose amounting to express malice unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the publication occurred with the knowledge that it was untrue or with reckless indifference to the truth: I agree with the submission that the desire of persons employed in the media to enhance their reputations by producing interesting and lively programs is not in itself a basis for finding malice. In particular, I agree with the statement in the speech of Lord Diplock in Horrocks v. Lowe, [1974] 1 All E.R. 662, supra, that: Judges and juries should, however, be very slow to draw the inference that a defendant was so far actuated by improper motives as to deprive him of the protection of the privilege unless they are satisfied that he did not believe that what he said or wrote was true or that he was indifferent to its truth or falsity.