What is the current state of the law on soft tissue injuries?

In evaluating the extent to which a claimant has suffered a soft tissue injury as a result of a motor vehicle accident, a number of well known principles emerge from the case law. As claims for non-pecuniary damages arising out of soft tissue injuries are often based upon subjective complaints of the claimant or plaintiff that are difficult to disprove, the courts have articulated a caution against extending the period of recovery beyond the usual time, unless there is some objective evidence that supports a continuing injury. McEachern C.J.S.C. (as he then was) articulated the need for caution in such cases in Butler v. Blaylock, [1981] B.C.J. No. 31 (B.C.S.C.) as follows: I am not stating any new principle when I say that the court should be exceedingly careful when there is little or no objective evidence of continuing injury and when complaints of pain persist for long periods extending beyond the normal or usual recovery. An injured person is entitled to be fully and properly compensated for any injury or disability caused by a wrongdoer. But no one can expect his fellow citizen or citizens to compensate him in the absence of convincing evidence - which could be just his own evidence if the surrounding circumstances are consistent - that his complaints of pain are true reflections of continuing injury.

This is not to be interpreted to mean that objective evidence is inevitably necessary to prove a soft tissue injury, as concluded by Parrett J. in Neilson v. Stevens, [1993] B.C.J. No. 580 (B.C.S.C.): This does not mean that it is necessary to demonstrate objective evidence of injury in order to recover. It represents a common-sense caution with which the court must approach the assessment of damages where there is a lack of objective medical findings and an unusual or unexplained recovery period.