Were that not the case, I would still have serious reservations as to whether the court is properly able to force the respondent to grant a religious divorce as requested. Section 21.1 threatens to deny a respondent standing in court if he fails to grant a religious divorce. That is, if he does not exercise his religious divorce process, we will not allow him to participate in the civil divorce process. But going further - to order a person to do a religious act - implicates issues of freedom of religion under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I note that s. 21.1(4) contains a defence to an application under s.(3) where the respondent proves that he has a genuine religious issue. In Bakhshi v. Hosseinzadeh, 2015 ONSC 7407 the court did order a husband to provide a religious divorce. In that case, the court relied on a decision that struck pleadings under the provincial equivalent of s.21.1 of the Divorce Act. The court in that case did not advert to the distinction between striking pleadings to try to encourage or coerce a religious divorce and the making of a mandatory injunction whereby a government official positively compels the respondent to perform a religious act. In my view, that distinction may well make a difference. This issue was not argued before me from first principles. Had I not declined to entertain the issue of the Iranian divorce for the grounds set out in the preceding paragraph, I would have declined to make the order sought at least without the benefit of further argument on the fundamental issues.
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