Has the court the power in these circumstances to extend the time for specific performance of the purchasers' covenant under the agreement for sale? In Davidson v. Sharpe, 1920 CanLII 83 (SCC), 60 S.C.R. 72, [1920] 1 W.W.R. 888, 52 D.L.R. 186, Anglin J. stated at pp. 84-85: The anomalies introduced by courts of equity in regard to the relations between mortgagor and mortgagee do not exist in regard to vendor and purchaser. A judgment or order declaring that on the happening of a certain event an agreement for sale shall be cancelled and at an end means precisely what it says and not merely that the plaintiff shall thereupon be entitled to have it cancelled and put an end to. When the purchaser under the order of the learned Chief Justice of British Columbia made default the agreement ceased to exist and the foundation for any right of personal recovery from the purchaser (except for costs) was gone. The purchaser thereafter had no further right to the land and the court has no jurisdiction to restore him to his former position. The vendor has the land. He cannot have the purchase money also.
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