My underlying reasons for this decision are these, viewed holistically: i. The marital home qualifies for consideration under Section 6. The petitioner solely acquired his family home (which he long occupied with his parents prior to marriage) from his parents as a form of inter vivos bequest, subject to a life interest to them; ii. The duration of the marriage was very short: “The length of the marriage is seemingly one of the most influential criteria to be considered in the analysis” (Yorke v. Yorke, infra at para. 20); iii. The length of time the parties occupied the home after marriage was even shorter; iv. During the parties occupation of the property as a marital home the petitioner’s father was still alive, exercising his life interest in the property, not only by occupancy but also by making all financial provision and taking on the vast bulk of household management tasks, and he was continuing to do so at the time of the parties separation; v. As between the parties, there is no evidence regarding the assumption of child care responsibilities for the respondent’s daughter. Even so, the extent of any such responsibilities for a child of a previous marriage in the unique circumstances here do not materially alter the weight to be given to the nature and very short duration of the occupancy of the marital home in the context of the very short marriage; vi. The promise made by the petitioner to bequeath the home to his wife and/or her daughter is legally unenforceable, was not made during the marriage but at the time of separation, and, in any event, is consistent with the petitioner’s ownership rights to the property;
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