What is the standard of review applied by the Court of Appeal in determining the apportionment of fault between a plaintiff and plaintiff?

The apportionment of fault following a finding of a breach of the standard of care that caused or contributed to the injury or loss must also be accorded deference by an appellate court. This standard of review was described in a vehicle-pedestrian tort case by Mr. Justice Dickson (in dissent) in Taylor v. Asody, 1974 CanLII 21 (SCC), [1975] 2 S.C.R. 414 at 423: Apportionment of fault is primarily and properly a matter within the discretion of the trial judge who has, as has so often been pointed out, the great advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, of observing demeanour, noting nuances of expression, detecting dissimulation. These are aids to judgment which cannot be reflected in the written record of a case and are, therefore, aids denied to an appellate court. We find, therefore, a consistent line of authority [citations omitted] which establish the principle that except in a strong and exceptional case, an appellate court will not feel free to substitute its apportionment of fault for that made by the trial judge unless there has been palpable and demonstrable error in appreciation of the legal principles to be applied or misapprehension of the facts by the trial judge.