What are the grounds of appeal in a sexual assault case?

I will add one additional comment. Counsel for the appellant decided to focus his argument on the two grounds of appeal that I have mentioned. He raised, but did not press, a ground of appeal based on the view that the offence of sexual assault, unlike the offence of assault, and unlike the former offence of rape, is an offence requiring a specific intent, that is, an intent to achieve either some form of sexually-related gratification on the part of the assaulter, or some form of reaction, either favourable or unfavourable, that acknowledges the sexual nature of the assault, on the part of the person assaulted. Notwithstanding that this ground of appeal was not pressed as a separate point, it underlay the argument that was made about drunkenness influencing the formation of an honest but mistaken belief in consent. But, on the view that I take of the evidence in this case, it is unnecessary for me to deal further with the reconciliation of Leary v. The Queen (1977), 1977 CanLII 2 (SCC), 33 C.C.C. (2d) 473, 74 D.L.R. (3d) 103, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 29, and Pappajohn v. The Queen (1980), 1980 CanLII 13 (SCC), 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481, 111 D.L.R. (3d) 1, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120, as they should be applied to the offence of sexual assault.