Does the term 'public interest' in s.1(1) of the Charter apply to a party's use of the term "public interest"?

In this case, when the discretionary provision is viewed in its context, there is no unconstitutional vagueness in the term 'public interest'. The discretion is guided by principle and the term 'public interest' is capable of judicial definition. Surely, the nature of the relief must be and will be structured to provide a solution to the problems which invoked the granting of the relief, that is the alleviation of the unfairness, or of a situation which is contrary to the public interest. Proof that the last election results fail to reflect increased public support for a specific party will be a factor to be considered in determining this question. This is the logical conclusion to be drawn in this case. I here refer to the decision of Lamer J. (as he then was) in Slaight Communications v. Davidson(1989) 1989 CanLII 92 (SCC), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 416 (S.C.C.) where he stated: As the Constitution is the supreme law of Canada and any law that is inconsistent with its provisions is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect, it, is impossible to interpret legislation conferring discretion as conferring a power to infringe the Charter, unless, of course that power is expressly conferred or necessarily implied. Such an interpretation would require us to declare the legislation to be of no force or effect, unless it could be justified under s. 1. Although this court must not add anything to legislation or delete anything from it in order to make it consistent with the Charter, there is no doubt in my mind that it should also not interpret legislation that is open to more than one interpretation so as to make it inconsistent with the Charter and hence of no force or effect. Legislation conferring an imprecise discretion must therefore be interpreted as not allowing the Charter rights to be infringed." (3) Conclusion