Is a constructive trust a remedy or a substantive claim?

That a constructive trust should be characterized as a remedy and not a substantive claim was recognized by McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Peter v. Beblow, 1993 CanLII 126 (SCC), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, where she criticized past case law for occasionally conflating “the remedial notion of constructive trust” with unjust enrichment itself, “as though where one is found the other must follow.” McLachlin J. clearly felt that such a fusion of right and remedy was in error, and she wrote that, "′[u]njust enrichment’ in equity permitted a number of remedies, depending on the circumstances,” and later, “[a] finding that a plaintiff is entitled to a remedy for unjust enrichment does not imply that there is a constructive trust.”