This, in my view, makes it unnecessary to consider further the application of the rule in Saunders v. Vautier (1841), 4 Beav. 115, 49 E.R. 282 (L.C.), about which there was disagreement in argument before me. We are here considering the application of equitable aid to execution, and if there be any problem as to whether the interest of the judgment debtor-annuitant is fully vested, or whether the consent of his wife is required before he could terminate the trust, then inasmuch as there is the unrestricted power to revoke that designation, the principle that equity regards as done that which ought to be done is sufficient answer. A judgment debtor cannot be permitted to shelter from his creditors assets, over which he has the undoubted power of disposition, by reliance upon a designation of a contingent interest which designation he has the unrestricted power to cancel.
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