In Stuart v. Hugh, 2011 BCSC 426, Verhoeven J. presided in a jury trial on damages for slander. Following the close of evidence and before the charge to the jury, the defendants applied for a ruling among others, on the question of probability of malice. Verhoeven J. proceeded to leave the case with the jury and reserve on the question of law about the probability of malice. The jury dismissed the case and Verhoeven J. gave his Reasons for Judgment, although moot, in the event that there might be an appeal. He said this by way of explanation: 42 Following the close of evidence and before the charge to the jury, the defendants applied for rulings that the slanderous words pleaded were spoken on an occasion of qualified privilege, and that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a probability of malice which would overcome the qualified privilege; therefore, there was no case to go to the jury. 43 In an oral ruling delivered February 18, 2011, I decided that the occasion on which the words were spoken was one of qualified privilege. However I reserved my decision on the question of probability of malice. In the result, I allowed the malice issue to go to the jury for decision. 44 As I explained in my ruling just given, the jury decided that the plaintiff failed to prove that the words alleged were spoken. Accordingly, they were not required to decide the malice issue. Therefore, this ruling is apparently moot. Once again, I render it only against the possibility of an appeal. (my emphasis)
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