Is there any evidence that corroborates the allegedly corroborated testimony of a witness who was severely impeached?

Defendants contend that the court must not focus on the "evidence that allegedly corroborated [Crummie's] testimony" when making its materiality determination, but rather must consider "any adverse effect" that the impeachment evidence could have had on their case. However, the standard for materiality is not whether the suppressed evidence had "any adverse effect" on a defendant's case, but whether there is a "reasonable probability" that the outcome would have been different had the evidence not been suppressed. (See Strickler v. Greene, supra, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 289.) Even where counsel's ignorance of suppressed impeachment evidence "made [the] conviction more likely," the evidence is not material if the record "provides strong support for the conclusion that [the defendant] would have been convicted . . . even if [the witness] had been severely impeached." (Id. at pp. 289, 294.) Here, defendants' recorded statements alone provide strong support for conviction, regardless of Crummie's credibility.

Moreover, defendants have pointed to no specific impeachment evidence regarding Crummie. Instead, they point to a potential additional sexual assault conviction and "agreements and facts involving other cases in which Crummie had testified." Presumably, defendants hope to find impeachment material in those "agreements and facts"; however, such a vague description is not enough to demonstrate the "reasonable probability" of a different outcome necessary for a finding of materiality. (Strickler v.

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