Is there a distinction between knowingly making and intentionally making false affidavits?

We think the distinction which counsel makes is a technical refinement which cannot prevail under the liberal provisions of section 1025 of the Revised Statutes (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 720). If the defendants knew that these affidavits would be false, and knew that the entrymen would have made contracts for the conveyance of the lands to be acquired by them, and having this knowledge nevertheless procured the making of them, there can be but one conclusion, and that is that they willfully, which is but another name for intentionally, entered into the conspiracy charged. While matters of substance are as essential now as before the passage of the statute, and of necessity must always remain so, we take it that its enactment was intended to have substantially the same effect as those of many of the states, which provide that an indictment which will enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended is sufficient.

In Van Gesner v. United States, 153 F. 54, 82 C.C.A. 188, it was observed by this court: