The following excerpt is from Bradway v. Cate, 588 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2009):
California legislature and courts have created a thin but meaningfully distinguishable line between first degree murder lying in wait and special circumstances lying in wait." That "thin" difference was that the language of the special circumstances statute at that time referred to murders committed "while" lying in wait, imposing a temporal requirement, and the first degree murder statute referred to murders committed "by means of" lying in wait, lacking such a requirement. Id. at 908. We held that this distinction was sufficient to define and differentiate the subset of defendants guilty of the special circumstance from the general run of defendants so that the special circumstance "does not encourage arbitrary enforcement, and is not unconstitutionally vague." Id. (footnote omitted); see also Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159, 1174-78 (9th Cir.2004) (upholding same special circumstance in death penalty case).
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