Is there a defense to the charge of disorderly conduct in a civil action brought by plaintiffs against the officers who arrested them?

We are not concerned with whether plaintiffs' asserted belief that the officers' behavior had given them implied permission to violate traffic laws otherwise banning pedestrians from the roadway would constitute a defense to the charge of disorderly conduct; that issue would be presented to a court adjudicating the criminal charges against plaintiffs. Instead, we are faced with the quite separate question of whether any such defense was so clearly established as a matter of law, and whether the facts establishing that defense were so clearly apparent to the officers on the scene as a matter of fact, that any reasonable officer would have appreciated that there was no legal basis for arresting plaintiffs. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on the legality of the action in its particular factual context). We cannot answer that question in the affirmative.