Is the parol evidence rule a bar to a plaintiff's action to enforce a constructive trust?

Nor is the parol evidence rule a bar to plaintiff's action. This is not an action to enforce the express oral trust, but an action to enforce a constructive trust which arises by operation of law upon the repudiation of the promise to reconvey. (Steinberger v. Steinberger, supra, (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 116, 119, 140 P.2d 31.) As such the statute of frauds has no application where a constructive trust is imposed. (Edwards v. Edwards (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 33, 202 P.2d 589.)

Furthermore, the same result would follow even if we disregard the confidential relationship. It is the general rule, supported by numerous authorities in California, that where property is conveyed without consideration to one who actually promises to reconvey to the grantor, the grantee may be compelled to make specific restitution. (Orella v. Johnson, supra, (1952) 38 Cal.2d 693, 697-698, 242 P.2d 5.)

Defendant further argues that plaintiff's first, second, third, fourth, and sixth causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations, because plaintiff's causes of action, if any, first arose in 1949 when she conveyed the properties to [226 Cal.App.2d 347] her mother. In support of this contention, defendant cites the case of Leeper v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal.2d 195, 1 Cal.Rptr. 12, 347 P.2d 12, 77 A.L.R.2d 803. That case, however, is inapplicable to the case at bar. This is not an action to set aside deeds obtained by fraud or duress since there is no contention on the part of the plaintiff that defendant practiced either fraud or duress upon her at the time the conveyances were made.