Is sexual penetration a specific intent crime?

Insofar as appellant argues that the court should have instructed the jury that sexual penetration required specific intent, his argument has merit. (People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323 [trial court must instruct the jury sua sponte on

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the general principles of law that are closely and openly connected to the evidence presented at trial], disapproved on another ground in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 200-201.) The court erred in describing the crime of sexual penetration of a child as a general intent crime instead of a specific intent crime. (People v. Whitham (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1290 [sexual penetration with a foreign object is a specific intent crime requiring purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse].)