Is evidence of a third party's attempt to intimidate a witness admissible at trial?

Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact of consequence to the determination of an action. (Evid. Code, 210.) But relevant evidence should be excluded if the trial court, in its discretion, determines that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will consume an undue amount of time, create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. (Evid. Code, 352.) "The trial court has broad discretion both in determining the relevance of evidence and in assessing whether its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value." (People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 900.) A court abuses its discretion when its ruling "falls outside the bounds of reason." (People v. De Santis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226.)

Evidence of a third party's attempt to intimidate a witness is not generally admissible to show a defendant's consciousness of guilt unless there is reason to believe the defendant was involved in the intimidation. (People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 924.) But "'"[e]vidence that a witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation for testifying is relevant to the credibility of that witness and is therefore admissible. [Citations.] An explanation of the basis for the witness's fear is likewise relevant to her credibility and is

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well within the discretion of the trial court. [Citations.]"'" [Citation.] "'Moreover, evidence of a "third party" threat may bear on the credibility of the witness, whether or not the threat is directly linked to the defendant.'" [Citation.]"'" (Id. at p. 925; People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1368-1369.)