Is a person arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol entitled to have their driving privileges suspended prior to a criminal conviction?

At issue here is the statutory procedure (see 13353.2 et seq.), often called the "administrative per se" law, ¹ under which a person arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, and who is determined to have a prohibited amount of alcohol in his or her blood, must have driving privileges suspended prior to an actual conviction for a criminal offense. We confronted this scheme most recently in Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500, 863 P.2d 745 (hereafter Gikas ); we there explained that "[t]he express legislative purposes of the administrative suspension procedure are: (1) to provide safety to persons using the highways by quickly suspending the driving privilege of persons who drive with excessive blood-alcohol levels; (2) to guard against erroneous deprivation by providing a prompt administrative review of the suspension; and (3) to place no restriction on the ability of a prosecutor to pursue related criminal actions. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 847, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500, 863 P.2d 745.)